This book provides an in-depth look at legal, economic and political issues related to safeguards in the WTO system. This is a close examination of the history of safeguards under the GATT and the opening of the agreement on safeguard measures during the Uruguay Round. It examines economic arguments for and against protection measures, including the presentation of the modern political economy of safeguard measures and “leak clauses” in international agreements. The following chapters focus on the main legal issues related to the application of safeguard measures, including procedural rules, the obligation to demonstrate unforeseen developments and increased imports, the notion of “serious harm,” the enigmatic causation test and the limitation of the scope of safeguard measures, including the principles of non-discrimination. All protection decisions made under the WTO system are carefully dissected and analysed. The annexes include the text of the treaty and relevant national legislation from the United States and the European Union. For example, the “specific safeguard measures” in Article 5 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and the “transitional guarantees” under Article 6 of the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Textiles apply only to agricultural or textile products. See chapters 6 and 9 of this book. 2. In the absence of agreement in the Article 12 consultations, paragraph 3, within 30 days, the exporting members concerned are exempt, no later than 90 days after the application of the measure, from suspending the suspension at the end of a period of thirty days from the date on which the Council for Trade in Goods received a written notification of the suspension. , the application, under the 1994 GATT, of concessions or other commitments essentially equivalent to the trade of the member applying the safeguard measure which the Council for Trade in Goods does not disapprove of the suspension of this measure.
The repeated application of protection measures for a particular product is limited by the agreement. As a general rule, a safeguard clause can only be re-applied to a product after the expiry of a period equal to the duration of the original safeguard clause, as long as the non-request period is at least two years. When applying a safeguard measure, the member must maintain a substantially equivalent level of concessions and other obligations to the exporting members concerned. In this regard, appropriate means of compensation can be agreed with the members concerned. In the absence of such an agreement, the exporting members concerned may individually suspend substantially equivalent concessions and other obligations. The latter right cannot be exercised during the first three years of a safeguard measure if the measure is taken on the basis of an absolute increase in imports and is in line with the provisions of the agreement by other means. Regional trade agreements have their own rules of protection. Some safeguards can be taken in the area of services, as provided for by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Article III of the IAEA statute gives the Agency, among other things, the power to implement and manage safeguards. If the Governing Council approves a hedging agreement, it authorizes the Director General to conclude the agreement and then implement it. Find out more → 2.
(a) In cases where a quota is distributed among the supplier countries, the member applying the restrictions may seek agreement on the allocation of quota shares with all other members who have a significant interest in delivering the product concerned. In cases where this method is not reasonably feasible, the member concerned shares members who have a core interest in providing the shares of the product on the basis of the shares of the product delivered by those members during a prior representative period of the total volume or total value of imports, taking into account all the particular factors that have or could affect the product`s trade.